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4 Improving Infrastructure Financing in Brazil
Preface
Many governments are finding it difficult to finance the growing demand for essential infrastructure 
through public funding alone. With the significant increase of debt in many countries while needs for 
essential infrastructure continue to expand, private-sector involvement has increasingly been viewed 
as a potential solution to closing the infrastructure financing gap and ensuring the efficient delivery 
and operation of infrastructure services. Still, private-sector investment in infrastructure, particularly in 
developing countries, remains low owing to a variety of real and perceived challenges.   
This insight report is the culmination of a multi-year collaboration between the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the World Economic Forum Global Future Council on Long-Term Investing, 
Infrastructure and Development 2016-2018. It presents recommendations that incorporate public 
and private sector input on how to tackle the key challenges in Brazil’s infrastructure market. The goal 
is to enhance trust between the public and private sectors, so that they may jointly mobilize more 
domestic and international financing to meet Brazil’s long-term infrastructure needs and increase the 
participation of long-term investors in Brazil’s infrastructure market.
The recommendations in this report build on those in the World Economic Forum report on Risk 
Mitigation Instruments in Infrastructure – Gap Assessment (2016), and this body of work has provided 
valuable insights to the Forum’s National Infrastructure Acceleration Initiative. The recommendations 
herein were developed through the conduct of interviews with working group members from the 
private sector and were endorsed by selected policy-makers. 
We would like to thank the Inter-American Development Bank, the Co-Chairs of the Global Future
Council on Long-Term Investing, Infrastructure and Development Rashad R. Kaldany and Alison
Tarditi, as well as Global Future Council member Sylvia Coutinho for their executive leadership and
support throughout this work, and the interview participants and members of the working group for
their invaluable contribution to this work.
Maha Eltobgy,
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Foreword
Brazil´s infrastructure investment as a proportion of GDP is estimated to be around 2%, whereas it 
is near 7% in China and 5.5% in India. This poses a significant challenge to realize Brazil´s growth 
potential. Higher investment in infrastructure would increase export competitiveness and boost 
productivity growth. Returning Brazil to a sustainable growth path requires scaling up investment in 
infrastructure to levels at least twice current levels. Political support is key to meeting this challenge. A 
coordinated effort by all stakeholders from the public sector, market participants and the international 
community is also essential considering the complex, multidisciplinary and long-term nature of 
infrastructure investment.
This study presents a set of recommendations for Brazil to transition to a new model of infrastructure 
financing. The recommendations are the result of extensive informal consultations conducted by 
experts in project finance with relevant stakeholders in the Brazilian infrastructure sector. This effort 
was facilitated by a pioneering partnership between the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and the World Economic Forum (the Forum). Close to 100 interviews and meetings were held with 
executives of state-owned and privately-owned banks, construction companies, utility companies, 
asset management firms and government officials.
The study’s main recommendations concern improving the role of the BNDES, Brazil’s national
development bank, as a private-sector catalyst that mobilizes resources to finance infrastructure 
projects. While maintaining its essential role in infrastructure financing, the BNDES will have to develop 
measures to mitigate risks by using project guarantees more extensively and by enlarging the pool of 
financiers. The recommendations herein echo the international call led by the United Nations, the G20, 
the G7 and other international fora to enhance the mobilizing role of multilateral development banks 
(MDBs) by crowding in private resources.
Infrastructure development generally finds broad support across the political spectrum. We hope that 
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Executive Summary
Brazil is transitioning from a model in which public financing 
is the dominant source for its infrastructure needs to a more 
balanced model in which the National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES) will be a catalyst for 
domestic and foreign private funding. This transition requires 
fundamental changes in instruments and rules to better 
manage risks and standardize the processes, contracts, 
financing instruments and insurance policies related to 
infrastructure projects and concessions needed to attract 
institutional investors.
This report presents the opportunities and challenges before 
the country’s infrastructure sector, with a focus on improved 
use of project guarantees, mitigation of certain risks, and the 
use of an enlarged pool of financiers.
Since 2014, the financing model for infrastructure projects 
that had long prevailed in Brazil and depended heavily on 
concessional BNDES lending, has been challenged by 
a series of events ranging from corruption scandals to a 
recession, defaults affecting long-term and bridge loans 
from banks, and fewer instruments available for covering 
project risks.
Brazil’s infrastructure is currently insufficient to meet the 
country’s development needs after years of underinvestment 
and requires investment conservatively estimated at around 
3.2% of GDP over 2019-2024. The total investment needed 
over the period comes to approximately R$205 billion 
annually. It is estimated that more than half of that must 
come from private domestic sources. Improving access 
to private finance implies changing the role of BNDES 
from a mere financier to a catalyst capable of mobilizing 
other sources of finance for infrastructure projects. This 
means that while BNDES will remain essential to financing 
infrastructure - especially in sectors such as railways, urban 
mobility, water and sanitation, and social projects - it will 
also need to “crowd in” other players by mitigating risks, 
such as completion risk and currency risk. With respect to 
currency risk, other Latin American countries, such as Chile 
and Peru, have demonstrated in the field of energy that by 
providing power purchase agreements (PPA) in US dollars 
they have been able to access cheaper and longer-term 
finance, particularly for renewables, which has led to the 
reduction of costs of generating electricity.
This report presents a series of recommendations intended 
to address some of the main challenges facing Brazil’s 
infrastructure sector as it transitions to this new financing 
model. 
Key recommendations include: 
1. Crowd in foreign finance by mitigating currency risk 
Three measures to mitigate the risk associated with foreign 
exchange fluctuations are particularly worth pursuing: 
 – Encourage the electricity sector to offer certain 
power purchase agreements (for instance, for 
renewables and transmission lines) in US dollars, up to 
a cap (for example, 10% of total sector revenues). This 
will allow concessionaires to access longer-term and 
cheaper financing in international markets, and ultimately 
reduce electricity prices for consumers.
 – Explore the advantages and disadvantages of using 
hedging mechanisms such as those recently used for 
toll roads and airport projects that allow for the risks of 
funding in foreign currency, limited to a cap, to be offset 
against the variable grant payments to the government. 
 – Improve the liquidity of long currency swaps. This 
market in Brazil is highly liquid only for terms of up to 
five years. Making longer-term swaps more liquid could 
serve as an option for projects where the two previous 
alternatives are neither feasible nor available. 
2. Mitigate construction risks by enhancing local 
market instruments 
 – Reinforce Brazilian insurers’ insurance policy for 
completion risks, to differentiate it from banking 
guarantees by requiring the former to cover the physical 
completion of a project and the latter its financial 
completion. 
 – Standardize engineering, procurement and construction 
(EPC) contracts in infrastructure projects.
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 – Develop “Mini-Perm” loans, which are long-term loans 
that commercial banks extend to a concessionaire, and 
that allow the bank to execute a PUT option against 
another lender after the physical and financial completion 
of the project. 
 – Enhance project finance through the involvement of 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), in partnership 
with BNDES, to partially or fully guarantee infrastructure 
debentures (a project bond exempt from income tax) 
during the construction phase.
3. Recycle BNDES assets and further develop capital 
market instruments by broadening the investor base 
 – BNDES could facilitate the prepayment of debts 
– currently allowed but difficult to do – so that 
concessionaires can take long-term loans with BNDES 
but prepay them by issuing infrastructure debentures. 
This would also allow BNDES to recycle its capital and 
support more projects. 
 
Regarding infrastructure debentures:
 – Extend the exemption to bonds denominated in Brazilian 
reals issued abroad, to differentiate, in tax terms, from 
the jurisdiction in which the bond is issued. 
 – Shift the tax benefits from the investor to the issuer. 
This would help level the playing field between foreign 
investors, pension funds and other investors. 
4. Reduce the impact of Basel III rules and other 
restrictions on long-term banking 
Capital requirements after Basel III dramatically reduced 
the capacity of banks to finance large projects in Brazil. 
To address this issue, this study makes the following  
recommendation:
 – Use capital market financing, not constrained by Basel 
III regulations, more intensively. Specifically, BNDES 
operations conducted through commercial banks could 
be structured as debentures. This would give commercial 
banks more flexibility to reduce their balance sheets and 
capital requirements over time.
Responsibilities for improving infrastructure financing 
in Brazil should be borne by both public and private 
agents. On the one hand, recommendations related to tax 
equalization on debentures and bonds, investment fund 
requirements and Basel III rules can only be led by the 
government. On the other, standardization of engineering, 
procurement and construction contracts, insurance policies, 
step-in clauses, and Mini-Perms should be led by capital 
market associations, BNDES and major commercial banks. 
Once private agents start adopting these practices, they are 
likely to become market standards.
The ultimate goal of these reforms is to improve the 
coverage, access and quality of infrastructure services 
for Brazilian citizens and to increase Brazil’s long-term 
growth potential by creating business opportunities in the 
infrastructure sector. The Inter-American Development Bank 
and the World Economic Forum, sponsors of the study that 
serves as the basis of this report, stand ready to support the 
implementation of these recommendations by the Brazilian 
government.
8 Improving Infrastructure Financing in Brazil
Changes in the Financing Model
The prevailing financing model for infrastructure projects in 
Brazil has undergone tremendous change in recent years. 
The previous model depended heavily on concessional 
BNDES funding, based on the subsidized Taxa de Juros 
de Longo Prazo (TJLP), or Long-Term Interest Rate.2 Large 
corporations that could provide real assets or banking 
guarantees as collateral were the main borrowers. These 
long-term funds were usually released around two years 
after the start of projects, which is why commercial banks 
often provided bridge loans to cover this gap.
Since 2014, many factors have challenged this model. 
First, an investigation into corrupt practices, the Operação 
Lava-Jato (“Carwash Operation”), undermined most of the 
large engineering, procurement and construction companies 
operating in Brazil. Second, the most serious economic 
crisis in 80 years led to an 8% decline in GDP in two 
years. Third, Basel III regulations and an increase in loan 
defaults have constricted long-term and bridge loans from 
commercial banks. Fourth, insurance instruments available 
to cover construction risks remain scarce, while the costs 
of banking guarantees for the construction phase have 
increased. Fifth, the base of lenders remains narrow; only a 
small number of local banks have balance sheets sufficient 
to finance large projects (above R$ 1 billion). The capacity 
of local capital markets to finance large-scale projects 
remains limited. Sixth, high yields in safe and liquid financial 
local currency assets have reduced the attractiveness for 
infrastructure assets in investor portfolios.
In May 2016, the Brazilian government initiated efforts to 
further develop infrastructure public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) and concessions. Besides launching a dedicated 
unit (known as the PPI Special Secretariat) to better 
coordinate ministries, regulatory agencies, financiers, and 
concessionaires, the government took significant steps 
to increase transparency in concession procurement 
processes and to improve investor confidence and 
financing conditions. Among these steps were the gradual 
elimination of the TJLP and its replacement with a market-
referenced rate Taxa de Longo Prazo (TLP), or Long-Term 
Rate, the reduction of BNDES support to projects along 
with an encouragement to use capital market instruments 
(debentures), and improved alignment of capital expenses 
with revenues in project cash flows.
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Current Funding Sources and Forecasts
After the worst recession in 80 years, the Brazilian 
economy is finally regaining traction in consumer spending 
and investor confidence. However, the country’s current 
infrastructure is insufficient to meet its development needs 
after years of underinvestment (around 2.3% of GDP over 
1993-2015).3 The pick-up in growth will require a boost in 
energy and logistics investments that this study estimates 
could amount to approximately 3.2% of GDP in 2019-
2024,4 taking into consideration some technical and financial 
restrictions. This conservative estimate is lower than the 5% 
of GDP estimated by other international experts.5
Figure 1 illustrates the amounts in Brazilian reals of 
investment in each infrastructure area since 2012 and the 
BNDES estimates for 2017-2020, based on client queries 
for new loans. Table 1 separates out telecommunications 
from other infrastructure because telecom investments in 
Brazil are usually made by private companies and financed 
by corporate debt and equity instead of relying on BNDES 
support, more readily sought in other infrastructure sectors.
BNDES made massive investments in 2012-2015, peaking 
at R$64.3 billion in 2014. In 2016, this amount declined 
by one-third (R$23.8 billion), although the other sources of 
financing remained at the same levels. According to BNDES 
estimates for 2017-2020, infrastructure will require around 
R$78 billion in investment, of which BNDES will fund only 
R$15 billion. The remaining financing needs will come from 
a mix of public and private sources. Under this scenario, 
financing for infrastructure investment is expected to be 
sufficient in the next few years.6
According to the study, it is estimated in 2019-2024  
approximately R$205 billion will be invested per year on 
the assumption that R$60 billion per year (30%) would be 
financed via equity, some R$30 billion a year would be 
financed by BNDES and R$115 billion by other sources. 
Most of the other sources will have to come from domestic 
and foreign capital markets (debentures and infrastructure 
debentures). Consequently, determining how to improve 
access to those markets should be a centrepiece of the 
government’s infrastructure policy and is the main objective 
of this report. The scenario calling for an increase of R$115 
billion per year assumes that domestic pension funds 
and asset managers would increase their allocations to 
infrastructure assets. However, the increase in volumes 
reflected in the (red boxed) amount in Figure 1 would only 
be possible by also attracting foreign sources of funding.
10 Improving Infrastructure Financing in Brazil
Sources: Mellis and Fenolio (2018) based on data from BNDES (2017), SIAFI and ANBIMA.
Note: ANBIMA = Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais; BNDES = Brazilian Development Bank; SIAFI = Sistema 
Integrado de Administração Financeira do Governo Federal (Integrated System of Federal Government Financial Administration).
b. Sources of infrastructure financing1
Sources: Mellis and Fenolio (2018) based on data from BNDES (2017), SIAFI and ANBIMA.
Note: DFIs = Development Financial Institutions; FI-FGTS = Fundo de Investimento do Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (Investment Fund of 
the Worker’s Severance Guarantee Fund); SIAFI = Sistema Integrado de Administração Financeira do Governo Federal (Integrated System of Federal 
Government Financial Administration); CEF = Caixa Econômica Federal (federal government-owned savings bank). 
1 Forecast and estimates in grey.
Figure 1: Investment & Sources of financing
a. Infrastructure investment by sector
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Figure 2 shows the expansion of the BNDES credit portfolio 
after 2005 and the decline in recent years. Considering that 
BNDES took over responsibility for financing most of the 
large projects in Brazil, the question now is what its next role 
should be.
Considering the new profile of infrastructure investors and 
sponsors, as well as the changes in public policies, the 
role of BNDES must change from a mere financier to an 
important catalyst that mobilizes private resources to finance 
infrastructure projects. This means that while BNDES will 
still remain essential for financing infrastructure, particularly 
in sectors such as railways, urban mobility, water and 
sanitation, and social projects, it will also need to play a key 
role in crowding in other players by mitigating some risks 
when others cannot afford to.
The Role of BNDES under the New Model
Figure 2: BNDES Disbursements, 2000-2018 [millions of Brazilian reals]
Source: BNDES. 
* September, last twelve months.
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1. Crowd in foreign finance by mitigating 
currency risk
The experience of financing infrastructure projects in other 
Latin American countries such as Chile, Peru, Colombia 
and Mexico indicates that the provision of revenues in US 
dollars has allowed for cheaper and longer-term financing, 
particularly in renewable electricity generation. Time-to-
maturity of debentures issued in domestic currency in 
Brazil’s capital market has been relatively short. The average 
tenure of infrastructure debentures is 9 years, and only 12 
out of 186 debenture issuances since 2012 had a tenure of 
at least 15 years. BNDES is still the almost exclusive source 
of loans with tenure of 25 years or more.7 The reduction 
in financing expenses reflected in lower yields and higher 
tenure available in hard currency would ultimately benefit 
end consumers because it reduces projects costs, resulting 
in lower user charges.
Financing infrastructure projects in US dollars comes with 
risks: on the one hand, it raises debt tenure and reduces 
interest rates; on the other, it adds volatility in debt service 
costs in local currency. Most infrastructure project revenues 
are in local currency, and they are not easily hedged. 
Projects may therefore be subject to severe financial distress 
in occurrences of unhedged exchange rate volatility. 
In Brazil, two complementary solutions could be pursued. 
First, a portion of infrastructure project revenues could 
be indexed to US dollars, which would pave the way for 
tapping more liquid, longer-term and lower-cost international 
financial markets. Second, foreign exchange rate hedges 
could be provided through clauses built into concession 
agreements or through measures to increase the long-term 
currency swap market liquidity. 
The Brazilian Government should examine the possibility 
of offering power purchase agreements in US dollars, in 
specific sectors such as transmission lines and renewables, 
to enable concessionaires to access longer-term and 
cheaper financing in international markets. This greater 
leverage in financing could result in greater discounts on 
the ceiling tariff in auctions, benefiting energy consumers by 
reducing the initial tariff they pay for services.
Another suggestion is to examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of using contractual hedging mechanisms in 
other sectors, such as the one developed for the last airport 
concession round. This mechanism basically allows for the 
risks of funding in foreign currency, limited to a cap, to be 
offset against the variable grant payment.
In addition, measures aimed at improving the liquidity of 
long-term currency swaps could offer an alternative for 
projects for which neither of the two previous alternatives 
work. The swap market in Brazil is highly liquid for terms up 
to five years, so efforts to increase liquidity in longer terms 
are needed.
These three measures try to match the currency risk 
of revenues and debt in a project. They are essential 
alternatives for crowding in foreign funding to projects, 
offering large pools of long-term credit for the financing of 
infrastructure in Brazil.
2. Mitigate construction risks by enhancing 
local market instruments
An insurance policy is available for completion risks in 
Brazil (Seguro Completion), but it has a spotty history. 
To reinvigorate the Seguro Completion, it is important to 
differentiate it from bank guarantees (Fiança Completion) by 
specifying that the former should cover a project’s physical 
completion and the latter its financial completion. Insurance 
companies have an interest in relaunching the Seguro 
Completion but need the step-in clauses to be improved 
and for an engineering team to monitor the various stages of 
the project. The Fiança Completion would benefit from third-
party validation of project completion.
One interesting and simple recommendation is to 
standardize the engineering, procurement and construction 
contracts in infrastructure projects by adopting, for instance, 
International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) 
rulings. This would facilitate assessment by financiers. The 
same recommendation applies to the adoption of accredited 
certification of projects that would rate their viability in terms 
of their technical and financial aspects, and their execution 
term. 
Another important suggestion is to develop “Mini-Perm” 
loans or long-term loans that commercial banks extend to 
a concessionaire. These arrangements allow the bank to 
liquidate the loan against another lender after the physical 
and financial completion of the project. BNDES could 
issue a PUT option on these loans to be exercised after 
completion. For instance, a commercial bank could lend 
to a project for 15 years and, after completion in year six, 
the bank could exercise a PUT option against BNDES or 
keep the loan. This would attract more private loans to 
infrastructure and reduce the period of BNDES commitment 
to funding from the period under the current arrangement.
Another recommendation to enhance project credit is 
to involve multilateral development banks (MDBs), in 
partnership with BNDES, to fully or partially guarantee the 
issuance of debentures during the construction phase. This 
could be done by MDBs financing a fund for guaranteeing 
completion. In any event, the reduction in the interest rate 
due to credit enhancement should be higher than the cost 
of an MDB guarantee scheme, resulting in a lower all-in cost 
for the operation.
Recommendations
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3. Recycle BNDES assets and further develop 
capital market instruments by broadening 
the investor base
The prepayment of debts is currently allowed, but difficult. 
BNDES could facilitate prepayment so that concessionaires 
could take long-term loans with BNDES but prepay them 
by issuing debentures. This would also allow BNDES to 
recirculate its capital and consequently support more 
projects. Another step along those same lines would be for 
BNDES to step up rates on a loan according to the accrued 
term. 
The infrastructure debenture law exempts those types 
of debentures from income tax on interest earned when 
bought by individual, institutional or foreign investors in 
Brazil. The exemption, however, does not apply to bonds 
issued abroad by the same infrastructure projects. This 
study recommends that these bonds should be exempt 
from withholding tax, so that the project would be indifferent, 
in tax terms, to the jurisdiction in which the debt instrument 
is issued. According to investors interviewed in the 
preparation for this study, there would be a relevant market 
for bonds in Brazilian reals under New York jurisdiction.
The tax exemption for infrastructure debentures has worked 
well in attracting high-income individuals to the market. 
It has failed, however, to attract institutional and foreign 
investors because they are already exempt in other, less 
risky assets, such as treasury bonds. The tax benefits of 
infrastructure debentures could be transferred from the 
investor to the issuer to enlarge the investor base.
4. Reduce the impact of Basel III rules and 
other restrictions on long-term banking
Capital requirements from commercial banks after the 
implementation of Basel III in Brazil dramatically reduced 
their capacity to finance large infrastructure projects. 
Under the Basel III liquidity framework, banks are required 
to hold more capital when lending long term in project 
finance structures. This limits the ability and willingness of 
commercial banks to engage in such operations due to 
the higher costs imposed on their balance sheets. Another 
restriction related to Basel III regulations is the maximum 
credit exposure to an economic group. If a series of projects 
will be conducted by the same economic group – each one 
of them a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) – the first project to 
be supported by a long-term loan can exhaust the capacity 
of that bank to support subsequent projects. 
In this more restrictive regulatory environment for 
infrastructure lending by commercial banks, a few 
alternatives could be considered. First, capital market 
financing, which is not constrained by Basel III regulations, 
could be used more intensively. For instance, indirect 
BNDES operations conducted through commercial banks 
could be structured as debentures, allowing commercial 
banks to have more flexibility in reducing their balance 
sheets and capital requirements over time. Second, if the 
regulation were to allow the SPV to be independent of the 
credit of the sponsor, after financial completion, more room 
for credit would be released to that economic group under 
maximum credit exposure requirements.
5. Other recommendations
One suggestion for reducing the amount of equity required 
for a project is to replace insurance policies or banking 
guarantees with reserve accounts. The latter are established 
in an infrastructure project as a liquidity buffer to match 
the payments to creditors during periods when cash flow 
is tight. Nonetheless, they are part of the equity required 
from shareholders and add equity costs to the project. If 
they were replaced by other guarantees, this would reduce 
project costs without reducing guarantees to creditors.
When a project defaults on payments to creditors, the 
concession agreement and related financial documentation 
generally have step-in rights provisions, which allow 
creditors to take over the operation and the assets related 
to that project. To improve step-in rules, regulations 
could make clear that, in project finance cases, the initial 
shareholders should have no right to claim any assets of the 
concession after the step-in clause enters into effect.
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Responsibilities for improving infrastructure financing in 
Brazil should be borne by both public and private agents. 
Only the government can implement recommendations 
related to tax equalization on debentures and bonds, 
investment fund requirements, step-in regulations and Basel 
III rules. These recommendations could be implemented in 
the short term, depending on the political context and the 
fiscal and monetary conditions. On the other hand, market 
associations, BNDES and major commercial banks should 
take the lead in standardizing engineering, procurement and 
construction contracts, insurance policies and Mini-Perms. 
Once these parties start adopting these practices, they are 
likely to become market practices.
Certain recommendations depend on changes to BNDES 
policies and practices, such as the prepayment of debts, 
stepping up rates on loans to stimulate capital recirculation, 
on lending with debentures and substituting an insurance 
instrument for reserve accounts in concessions. Of course, 
BNDES will need to align some of these changes with other 
government entities.
When it comes to the recommendations associated 
with currency risk, “one size does not fit all.” They 
are sector- or project-specific and will require better 
coordination among various government entities, such 
as the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Transportation and 
Energy, the Casa Civil,8 and the Special Secretariat of the 
Investment Partnership Program (PPI).9 The PPI works as 
a ministerial-level executive committee that encompasses 
all relevant public sector stockholders. As such, it is well-
suited to coordinate the efforts to implement this study’s 
recommendations. 
Figure 3 presents the purpose and availability of the 
mechanisms associated with the recommendations 
discussed in the previous section. The instruments shaded 
in green are already operational, those in yellow exist but 
could be improved and those in orange are scarce and need 
to be developed further.
Once the government has identified which 
recommendations to address, an action plan on how 
to move them forward can be developed based on 
discussions with the government entities involved. Some 
recommendations require changes in regulations, while 
others could be advanced by adapting BNDES and/or 
government policies. The IDB and the Forum could then 
support the Brazilian Government in implementing the 
recommendations.
Next Steps and Action Plan
Figure 3: Status of mechanisms associated with study recommendations
Source: Mellis and Fenolio (2018). 
Notes: BNDES = National Bank for Economic and Social Development; EPC = Engineering, Procurement and Construction; USD = US dollars.
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Endnotes
1. Central Bank of Brazil Resolution # 2.844 of 29 June 2001.
2. A regulated interest rate set quarterly by the National Monetary Council (composed of the Minister of Finance, who 
acts as its chairman, the Minister of Planning and the Central Bank Governor) that served as the base interest rate for 
BNDES loans.
3. Pereira and Puga (2016).
4. Authors’ forecast based on BNDES (2017). Please refer to Figure 1 and to Mellis, C. and Fenolio, L. (2018) for details. 
5. See Serebrisky et al. (2015).
6. Authors scenarios based on BNDES (2017). Refer to Figure 1 and to Mellis, C. and Fenolio, L. (2018) for details. 
7. Ministério da Fazenda (2018) and Mellis, C. and Fenolio, L. (2018). 
8. Casa Civil is the Chief of Staff of the Presidency. 
9. The Investment Partnerships Program (PPI) was created in 2016 to coordinate public-private partnerships for federal 
infrastructure investments. It comprises the President of Brazil, government ministers from the ministries concerned, 
Federal Public Bank Chief Executive Officers, and a dedicated Special Secretariat.
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